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RECENT CASES
same result-9 as that reached in the instant case. However, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has allowed several exceptions to the
rule excluding parol evidence..
2
1
It is submitted that, since insertion of an integration clause into a
contract has become such a common practice as to lose its distinc-
tive character, its mere inclusion should not bar evidence which
might otherwise be admitted. It may be surmised that, had the
Oklahoma Court followed this suggestion, it would have held for
the defendant.
MAURICE R. HUNKE
CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER - "YEAR AND A DAY" RULE.-
Defendant was indicted for murder and manslaughter following
the death of an assault victim struck on September 21, 1958, and
who died November 1, 1959. From a lower court order overruling
defendant's motion to quash the indictment, the defendant appeals.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, two judges dissenting,
that the common law rule that no one is responsible for a killing
where death ensues beyond a year and a day after the stroke is
not a part of the definition of murder but only a rule of evidence
or procedure; and that the motion to quash was properly overruled.
The dissent attacked this decision as being judicial legislation,
spurning the law of cause and effect. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402
Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
At common law a killing does not constitute murder unless the
death ensues within a year and a day after the stroke.1 The in-
adequacy of medical science to establish beyond peradventure a
causal connection between the injury and death which occurred a
long period of time later led to the founding of the rule.2
Eleven states, including North Dakota, have statutes expressly
promulgating the rule.3 Judicial decisions, holding that legislative
19. See, e.g., Mevorah v. Goodman, 79 N.D. 443, 57 N.W.2d 600 (1953); Hanes
v, Mitchell, 78 N.D. 341, 49 N.W.2d 606 (1951); Larson v. Wood, 75 N.D. 9, 25
N.W.2d 100 (1946); Jensen v. Siegfried, 66 N.D. 222, 263 N.W. 715 (1935).
20. See, e.g., Rule v. Connealy, 61 N.D. 57, 237 N.W. 197 (1931) (Allowed to show
that delivery was conditional); Carufel v. Kountz, 60 N.D. 91, 232 N.W. 609 (1930)
(fraud); Baird v. Divide County, 58 N.D. 867, 228 N.W. 226 (1929) (governmental
body exceeded its authority); Erickson v. Wiper, 33 N.D. 193, 157 N.W. 592 (1916)
(true consideration for a deed); Citizens' State Bank of Lankin v. Garceau, 22 N.D. 576,
134 N.W. 882 (1912) (defective title).
1. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 197 (Lewis's ed. 1897); 3 COKE, INSTITUTES
47 (1817).
2. State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17 (1876); see 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
315 (3rd ed. 1923).
3. N.D. Cent. Code § 12-27-27 (1961) "'To make killing either murder or man-
slaughter in prosecutions for homicide, it is requisite that the party shall die within a
year and a day after the stroke is received or the cause of death is administered. In the
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silence does not abrogate the rule, but rather is evidence that it
should persist, have introduced the rule into states without
statutory provisions.4 But the ruie has encountered vehement op-
position in New York where it has been wholly abrogated by
statutory construction. 5
Controversy exists as to whether the rule is a substantive part of
the definition of murder 6 or whether it is a rule of evidence;' with
the sides almost equally divided. The most recent case in point,
while declaring the rule to be one of evidence and severely criticiz-
ing it, has upheld the rule as one which could only be changed by
the legislature."
Therefore, even upon the grounds that the rule is one of evidence
the decision in the instant case is a severe departure from the
principle of stare decisis. It would appear that this change, how-
ever, is based on good reason for none of the defendant's substan-
tive rights will be denied. Two essential elements are still necessary
to establish defendant's guilt. It must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt9 that his act is the proximate cause; and there must
exist no unforeseeable intervening agency.1" Advancement in science
and medicine has destroyed the logic of the rule;1- and it has no
counterpart in civil liability for wrongful death.12 It has been
considered by one authority to be merely an arbitrarily mechanical
rule.-l The rule often subsists only because of the infrequency of
contested cases.'
computation of a year and a day, the whole of the day on which the act was done shall
be counted as the first day." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-458 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2210
(1947); Cal. Penal Code § 194 (1955); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-9 (1953); Del. Code
Ann. § 11-573 (1953); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4008 (1947); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §
365 (1960); Mont. Rev. Code § 94-2509 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.100 (1957);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-7 (1953).
4. State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); see Ball v. United States,
140, U.S. 118 (1891); Howard v. State, 24 Ala. App. 512, 137 So. 532 (1931); Head
v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Jamerson, 252 S.W. 682
(Mo. 1923).
5. People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v. Legeri, 239
App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933) (These New York decisions hold that the common
law rule has been abrogated by Section 22 of the New York Penal Law which abolishes
all common law crimes, and Section 1044 which deliberately omits any limitation as to
time in its definition of murder.)
6. State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash.
684, 243 Pac. 854 (1926).
7. People v. Clark, 106 Cal. App. 2d 271, 235 P.2d 56 (1951); Head v. State,
68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim.
1959); State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17 (1876).
8. Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. 1959).
9. People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934).
10. See 65 Dick. L. Rev. 166 (1961).
11. See Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); People v. Legeri,
239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933); Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim.
1959).
12. Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894).
13. See Perkins, Criminal Law 605 (1957).
14. See Zacharias, Homicide: Why Dcath in a Year and a Day? 19 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 181, 187 (1941).
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Therefore, it is submitted that the rule be abolished so that the
prosecution may be given a chance to overcome the difficulty of
proof if the proximate relationship between injury and death can
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
BERNARD HAUGAN
DIVORCE DECREE - DURATION AND TERMINATION OF LIABILITY
FOR SUPPORT - DOES THE FATHER'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT His
MINOR CHILDREN TERMINATE AT HIS DEATH? - Petitioner, divorced
wife of deceased brought on action against his estate as guardian
of her minor daughter seeking an order to obtain monthly support
payments accruing subsequent to the death of the deceased. The
grounds of the petition were that the obligations of the deceased
with respect to an agreement incorporated into a divorce decree
survived his death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, four justices
dissenting, held that such liability may be imposed against the
father's estate only when the contract to support, affirmatively so
provides, either by express terms or fair implication. Lewis v. Lewis,
125 So. 2d 286 (Miss. 1960).
At common law the father's obligation to support his offspring
terminated at his death.' The arguments given for adhering to
the common law rule are that the father has the right to disinherit
his children2 and that to permit such obligation to survive would
upset the laws regulating the distribution and devolution of
estates.- Where a divorce decree alone has made provision for
support payments4 or where a prior agreement has been incorporat-
ed into the divorce decree,; a few jurisdictions hold that the
obligation does not survive the father's death. This minority, rely-
ing on their interpretation of the separation agreement incorporated
in the divorce decree, reason that it must so provide either expressly
or by necessary implication in order that the payments survive the
father's death.6
The weight of authority today, however, is that the support
1. Guinta v. LoRe, 31 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1947) (dissenting opinion); Carey v. Carey,
163 Tenn. 486, 43 S.W.2d 498 (1931).
2. Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948).
3. Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43, S.W.2d 498 (1931).
4. Cooper v. Cooper's Estate, 350 Il. App. 37, 111 N.E.2d 564 (1953).
5. Gordon v. Gordon, 195 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bowling v. Robinson, 332
S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1960); In re Johnson's Estate, 185 Misc. 352, 56 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Surr.
Ct. 1945).
6. See Note 5 supra.
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